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Airbus Industrie overtakes Boeing 
by Christopher Layton, European Commission director responsible for 
aerospace 
The success of Airbus Industrie's A300 
aircraft offers a significant opportunity to 
the European aerospace industry. At a 
time when one can only contemplate 
ruefully the performance of so many 
industrial sectors in Europe there is one 
whose performance is beginning to give 
g~nuine cause for optimism - the 
aerospace industry. It is no secret that the 
military side has been doing well for some 
time but more importantly the civil side 
shows signs of increasing in health and 
vigour. The purpose of this article is to 
show that its success is due to and a 
consequence of collaboration on a 
European basis; however it is more 
important to have understood that such 
success has been hard won. In a sense it is 
only a beginning and if the European 
industry wants to become a genuine force 
on the world market it has to build on 
what it has already achieved by taking 
some important decisions in the near 
future . 
For a long time the European civil 
aircraft sector was in effect in decline. 
When the Commission published a set of 
proposals for the aeronautical sector in 
1975, it noted that the European share of 
the world civil market had declined to 7. 9 
per cent. Since then the A300 Airbus has 
begun to achieve a degree of success . In 
June this year Airbus lndustrie was able to 
announce that orders and options for 
both the 250 plus seater A300 and the 200 
plus seater A3 l O amounted to over 350 
aircraft. Various forecasts predict that the 
present versions of the Airbus will have 
sold between 800 and 1,000 aircraft by 
1990. This will be an unprecedented 
success for a European civil jet transport. 
However even that success will only result 
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in the European airframe industry having 
approximately 15 per cent of the world 
market*. 
It should be remembered that the 
success of the Airbus is comparatively 
recent - until 1978 sales were quite slow. 
The first glimpse of a breakthrough came 
with the order from Eastern Airlines in 
the US A. At the same time it was 
primarily a Franco-German project, the 
interests of most of the UK industry 
lying elsewhere. Rolls Royce declined to 
invest in putting the RB211 on the Airbus 
and directed its efforts into having a new 
version of the RB211 engine - the 
RB21 l-535 - launched to fit the smaller, 
narrow-bodied Boeing 757. The British 
airframe manufacturers contemplated 
putting all their energies into a 
collaboration with a US manufacturer. 
However, in June 1978, a series of 
decisions settled the basic orientation of 
the manufacturers, at least for one area of 
the market. Airbus lndustrie decided to 
launch the A3 IO, a smaller, i.e. 200 plus, 
version of the A300. The UK government 
decided to allow British Aerospace to 
join the Airbus consortium and to allow 
Rolls Royce to build the RB21 l-535 . 
Finally British Airways decided to order 
the Boeing 757 with the RB2 l l-535 
engines. 
The net effect of these decisions has 
been on the one hand to ensure, by 
uniting the interests of the main European 
airframe manufacturers, the success of the 
current A300 project, and on the other 
hand to oppose the interests of Rolls 
Royce to those of the airframe sector. 
Apart from British Aerospace joining the 
Airbus consortium, Belgium and Spain 
*Estimated by Merrill Lynch. 
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D A300 
are also associated, the Netherlands are 
believed to have accepted in principle the 
idea of participation, and most national 
European airlines have become customers 
- Lufthansa, Air France, Alitalia, Iberia, 
Swissair, etc., as well as several charter and 
private lines like Laker, but not - for the 
present - British Airways. Moreover in 
joining the consortium the various 
manufacturers have agreed that future 
civil projects should be done within the 
same framework. This last point is vital 
because to become a real competitor of 
Boeing or Douglas it will be necessary to 
have a family of aeroplanes, with 
common marketing and common spares 
and support facilities. At the same time 
the commercial and political pressure that 
can be used to support the sales of the 
industry when their interests are united by 
a common project is greater than the sum 
of its parts. 
However it is precisely in this area of 
future projects that the problems lie. 
Most commentators agree that apart from 
the wide-bodied 220 seater, for which the 
Airbus A310 and the Boeing 767 will be in 
contention, two of the most important 
market slots to be filled between now and 
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1990 are those for a narrow-bodied 160 
plus seater and a narrow bodied 120 plus 
seater. These are two areas in which 
European manufacturers have had some 
success in the past and can reasonably be 
expected to have some success in the 
future provided they choose collaborative 
projects done within the framework of 
Airbus Industrie. However, when one 
comes to examine the potential projects, 
certain problems for the European 
industry become apparent. 
First, on the 160 plus seater, Boeing 
already has a project - the Boeing 757 
ordered by Eastern Airlines and British 
Airways - which it has announced it will 
modify to meet head on any competition 
from a European project. The 8757 is 
being offered initially with Rolls Royce 
engines and Rolls Royce would naturally 
like to see it succeed. Moreover it is not 
unlikely that a European 150 plus seater 
would be based upon the SNECMA-GE 
CFM 56 engine, for which Rolls Royce 
has no competitor. Rolls Royce might well 
consider their interest therefore to run 
counter to any European project in this 
area. 
Secondly, on the 120 plus seat prospect 
Fokker have been advocating for some 
time a project called the F29 or F28 Super 
as a logical progression to their F27 and 
F28. Fokker would prefer however that 
even on a collaborative project they 
should remain a separate entity from 
Airbus lndustrie. Although this is a 
natural objective, it runs counter to the 
aims of a united and forceful European 
industry. Furthermore they have been 
offended by the re-launching in 1978 by 
the UK Labour government of the HS 
(now BA) 146, a project which they regard 
as competitive with their F28 and likely to 
injure the prospects of an F29. Fokker has 
therefore been talking with third party 
countries with a view to a possible 
collaboration, and this is clearly harmful 
to the prospects of a joint European 
project. 
One of the dangers inherent in the 
present situation as far as the European 
industry is concerned is the actual success 
of the Airbus. To meet demand Airbus 
lndustrie is having to increase productior 
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from 2 to about 8 aircraft per month. 
Whilst this is good for employment and 
the equipment suppliers and it enables, at 
last, European manufactureres to obtain 
pricing and productivity levels on the basis 
of USA-length production runs, it also 
means that much energy and time has 
to be spent on ensuring the success of the 
existing products (the 82, 84 and 310) and 
studying future derivatives (the 89 and 
As so often in the past what is now 
needed is political will and clarity of 
purpose . There are some hopeful signs. 
Rolls Royce for example has at last signed 
an agreement with Airbus Industrie to 
cover the cost of designing and testing the 
. installation of the R8211 on the A300. 
Japan has indicated a desire to collaborate 
with a united Europe industry on a 120 
plus seat project. What then is needed is 
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811 ), perhaps at the expense of projects 
such as the 160 plus seater and the 120 
plus seater. 
In the long term however it is only by 
having a range of projects, as Boeing does, 
that the European industry will be 
sufficiently cushioned against the swings 
of the market. One single project is too 
dangerous. 
B 757 
one or more follow-up projects within the 
framework of Airbus Industrie. The 
market will decide which project should 
come first and when, but the problems of 
organisation and finance for anew 
project should be studied immediately . 
Europe has a fine opportunity to build 
up a key sector and this is an opportunity 
which should not be lost. 
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Lord Thomson of Monifieth, PC, former European 
Commissioner, asks why the Community has been 
allowed to become the scapegoat of our own economic 
failures. 
It is said that the British people have 
become indifferent to the European 
Community . The level of poll at the first 
European General Election in June 
appears to bear this out. Is it true? If it is 
true - why is it so? Is it a failure of 
communication? In this ASLIB lecture* I 
want to try to answer these questions 
It has been my general experience as a 
working politician that when things go 
wrong it is almost a reflex action to make 
communications the scapegoat. When a 
government goes through an unpopular 
phase it is said that it must be because it is 
failing to communicate the realities of the 
problems and the excellence of the 
government's proposals to deal with them 
to the general public. When a government 
gets into that mood, it has equally 
invariably been my experience that it is 
unpopular not because the public fails to 
understand its policies, but because it 
dislikes and disagrees with them. 
ls it the same with the European 
Community? Is the reason for the apathy 
and hostility in Britain that the public now 
understands only too well what the 
Community is about and simply doesn't 
like it? 
I do not believe that dislike of 
Community policies was a main reason 
for the low poll. If that had been the case 
there would have been a rush to vote for 
the many Labour candidates who made 
no secret of their hostility towards the 
Community and all its works. And that 
certainly did not happen . 
It is true that one reason for the 
negative state of public opinion in Britain 
about the Community is a growing 
awareness that Britain , as one of the 
poorer countries of the Community, is 
beginning to become the biggest net 
contributor to the budget. But this British 
obsession - that we have become the 
poor man of Europe being exploited by 
cleverer Continentals - besides being 
sadly lacking in pride, itself reflects the 
se rious distortions of the Community's 
image that have been allowed to grow up 
in Britain. 
My purpose is to examine why the 
communication of a balanced picture of 
the Community should be so difficult in 
Britain, rather than to rehearse once again 
the political pros and cons of British 
membership . The issue is why has the 
Community been allowed co become the 
scapegoat for our own economic failures? 
*Association of Specialist libraries and Information Bureaux, 13 June 1979. 
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Could a more effective Community 
communications policy have prevented 
this - or at least mitigated it? 
I believe that the main fault lies in 
Britain, not in Brussels, that there has 
been a serious abdication of political 
leadership over Community issues within 
the United Kingdom. But there are several 
obstacles to an effective Community 
information policy that belong to Brussels 
and affect the Community as a whole. 
Obstacles to effective 
information policy 
The first is the simple fact that the 
European Community is a complicated, 
unprecedented multi-national institution. 
It has been said of the elephant that 
though it is hard to describe, you can 
always recognise one when you see it. For 
the professional communicator the 
Community is worse than the elephant 
since it is not only hard to describe, but 
often equally hard to comprehend when 
you watch it at work. Both for the 
information officials of the Community, 
and for the journalists seeking to 
encapsulate the late-night convolutions of 
the Agricultural Ministers in a snappy 
story, the Community is a formidable, 
forbidding technical problem in the art of 
communications. 
But the Community, like many a 
human institution, is often its own worst 
enemy. It has an infinite capacity for 
making the simple complicated and since 
it does this with an openness unknown to 
national governments and at infinite 
length, there is maximum opportunity for 
letting cats (imaginary or otherwise) out 
of bags, drawing shoals of red herring 
across the Community scene and setting 
the maddest of March hares running in all 
directions, without a hope of harrassed 
Community information officials ever 
being able to catch up with them. The 
myths that grow up are myriad and hydra-
headed. No sooner is one slain than 
another takes its place . Euro-beer, the 
extinction of the English apple, the 
interference with the sex life of the 
English hop, the abolition of the 
traditional uneviscerated Christmas 
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turkey - if I have strangled that mythical 
turkey once, I have done it a dozen times 
and yet it still keeps flapping its wings! 
Of course, there is no smoke without 
fire . The very openness of Community 
government provides a fertile seed-bed for 
myths to grow. The bright idea of some 
Commission back room boy is floated as a 
trial balloon without his departmental 
chiefs knowing in advance. Legislative 
proposals which would be discussed 
behind closed doors in Whitehall are aired 
in a network of consultative groups, and 
even supposedly secret Commission 
debates tend to be reported blow by blow. 
It would be healthy if only the public 
could be made to appreciate the difference 
and the long time scale between an idea, a 
Commission proposal and a Council 
decision. 
Most daft ideas gradually disappear, 
like the smile on the face of Lewis 
Carroll's Cheshire cat, before they 
become official Commission proposals. 
But the Commission machinery is 
cumbersome, and sometimes the 
Commissioners sitting in their 13-storey 
eyrie preoccupied with major issues like 
freezing CAP prices or initiating an 
energy policy, nod when it comes to a 
proposal to harmonise the noise level of 
motor mowers from Greenland to Sicily. 
Only Britain questions 
membership 
There are also problems special to Britain 
- and to some extent to Denmark. There 
is no doubt that apart from Denmark the 
level of commitment to the Community is 
lowest in the United Kingdom. It is not 
that on the mainland there is a starry-eyed 
enthusiasm for the Community. They 
simply tend to take the Community for 
granted, part of the general framework 
of government like their national admini-
strations, necessary, useful and fallible. 
It is only in Britain (and in Denmark) 
that the permanence of Community 
membership remains to be questioned. 
Why? ls it primarily a problem of 
communications? Could it be changed 
if only the Community information 
services were to have more 
7 
money to spend on publicising the 
Community or to operate more 
effectively? 
I do not believe this is the problem. No 
doubt the estimable Eurocrats in the 
London information office of the 
Community would welcome a bigger 
budget, and no doubt they would be the 
first to admit that they have their share of 
sins of omission and commission. 
But the problem lies not in the 
Community's outpost in London, but 
right at the heart of British politics in 
Westminster . The Commission's 
information budget for the United 
Kingdom is tiny compared to the annual 
budget of the Central Office of 
Information without counting the cost of 
the many departmental information 
machines . If public expenditure on 
information about Britain's future in the 
Community is to make a contribution, the 
major role must be played by the national 
state. 
Labour's ambivalence 
But for the last five years the Labour 
Government has given no priority to 
emphasising the importance of making a 
success of British membership of the 
Community and of the Community's role 
in world affairs. It is government that 
sets the climate of public opinion. It is 
what Ministers say in public and in private 
about the European Community that sets 
the tone of national debate, that 
determines what the senior civil servants 
and departmental information officers 
say, that influences the attitudes of the 
leader-writers and the TV pundits. For 
five years, the Labour Government, in 
that most typical phrase of the times, 
adopted a low profile over the European 
Community. And to a large extent the 
post-Heath Conservative opposition 
tended to lie low, too. They refused to risk 
giving any electoral ground to their 
opponents. With no leadership about the 
historic advantages of Community 
membership, the way was clear for the 
grousers and the grumblers to engage in a 
steady drip, drip, drip of denigration. It 
did you more good in the leadership 
stakes in both Government and 
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Opposition in those days to play John 
Bull at the despatch box at the expense of 
practical re,ults in the ongoing Brussels 
negotiations. 
This attitude did not arise from any 
conviction that Britain had made an error 
in remaining in the Community at the 
time of the 1975 referendum, that some 
big change had taken place that justified a 
change of position . That would have been 
intellectually respectable. 
The ambivalent attitude taken up by the 
Labour Government owed little to any 
intellectual doubts about membership of 
the Community and much to an 
ideological division within the Labour 
Party, and indeed within the Labour 
Cabinet. Patching up party unity was 
considered a great deal more important 
matter than the historic issues associated 
with British membership of the 
Community. 
Party unity , what si ns are committed in 
thy name! 
In the name of party unity the 
Government refused to commit the party 
to the plan for a fairer electoral system 
which it itself supported. The 
Conservative leadership took an even 
more negative attitude to Liberal 
proposals for proportional representation. 
As a result Britain has now contributed a 
grotesquely distorted delegation to the 
European Parliament. In the name of 
Party unity and with Conservative 
acquiesence, the information services of 
the Com unity in Britain were discouraged 
from pulling out the stops in a colourful 
and imaginative public relations campaign 
to excite public interest in the European 
elections. Instead the large budget of one 
million was spent largely on the dullest, 
most neutral of 'official public service' 
advertising. And even that was in the 
event limited in its operation by the 
national General Election. 
The truth is that the task of persuading 
ancient European nations to pool limited 
but important aspects of their sovereignty 
in a single Community is an immensely 
difficult one. It involves painful changes 
in familiar and cherished national ways of 
conducting both public and private 
business. It requires a patient search for 
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necessarily complicated compromises, and 
a willingness to explain to the layman why 
these often irritating alterations in our 
national procedures are a necessary means 
to the achievement of great long term 
goals - the creation of a Continental-
scale economy and a political unity that 
are our best guarantees of future peace 
and prosperity. The ordinary citizen 
earning his or her daily living cannot be 
expected to follow the technical details of 
Green Pounds and European Currency 
units. It requires political conviction and 
vision, and political will of a high order if 
the nations of the Community are steadily 
to build a more united Europe. 
The present state of public opinion in 
Britain about the Community is not a 
failure of information policy, but of 
political leadership . It was dramatically 
underlined by the failure of both the 
Labour and Conservative leaders to 
campaign in the European General 
Election on anything remotely like their 
personal commitment in the national 
General Election. The Liberal leadership 
with heroic consistency despite the 
electoral dice being loaded against them 
fought the campaign properly. But it was 
little wonder that if the nation's leaders in 
both the .nain parties refused to take the 
Euro-poll seriously that the ordinary 
voter followed suit. 
Prospects under the 
Conservatives 
The new Government claims it will do 
things differently . It says it will pursue the 
European ideal while vigorously fighting 
Britain's corner over matters like CAP 
and the budget. We shall see. It is 
certainly the better way to seek results in 
Europe. But they have to prove they are 
ready to pursue their European policy 
with more leadership and conviction than 
they showed in conducting their election 
campaign. We should not underestimate 
the problems. It is an axiom of 
information policy that it cannot 
artificially create a climate of opinion. It 
can only inform and reinforce a national 
mood which is itself the product of much 
wider and deeper political and social 
trends. Public confidence - especially in 
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such a novel and non-traditional concept 
as a multi-national Community - is easy 
to erode and much harder to recreate. 
Over the recent years of reluctant and 
lukewarm Europeanism in Britain our 
original large stock of goodwill amongst 
our partners has been steadily run down. 
They have become unconvinced of our 
desire to share in the leadership of Europe 
as we have done in the past, and indeed of 
our will and capacity to reverse our deep-
seated relative economic decline . And yet 
the goodwill of our partners and their 
readiness to make concessions is essential 
to solving the problem of Britain's 
inequitable budget contributions and 
restoring the belief of the British people in 
the Community. 
Bi-partisan approach 
Making a success of Britain in the 
Community ought to be a bi-partisan -
indeed a tri-partisan - matter. It is a 
tantalising thought that if Labour had 
won the 1970 election a Labour 
Government would have taken Britain 
into the Community with Conservative 
and Liberal support, and the anti-
Europeans of both main parties would 
have been an isolated minority. Many of 
the problems I am discussing here 
would never have arisen, and others like 
the Community budget would have been 
simpler to solve. As it is, the new 
Government will find it will require long, 
patient, steady effort to turn round the 
present mood about Britain and the 
Community on both sides of the Channel. 
There are many legitimate differences 
of view between Right, Left and Centre 
about the best internal policies for the 
Community to pursue. Everyone who 
believes that Britain's future lies in 
membership of an effective Community 
will hope that the new Conservative 
Government will from now on make the 
EEC the centre-piece of our foreign 
policy. Equally, they will hope that the 
new Labour Opposition will not allow its 
largely self-inflicted humiliation in the 
European General Election to push 
Labour into being a completely anti-
Community party committed to British 
withdrawal. 
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Towards a new international economic order 
by Malcolm Subhan 
Brussels correspondent of the Economic Times, Bombay 
A non-event which cost $100 million to 
stage. This was the popular verdict in the 
West on the fifth United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, 
which met in Manila recently. But it was 
not altogether fair to a conference which 
brought together an estimated 5,000 
delegates from nearly 150 countries. 
For many Western observers the Manila 
conference was headed for failure even 
before it opened simply because it lacked 
a focal point. But the fact is that every 
UNCT AD conference has had a long, 
cluttered agenda; where an issue has 
emerged to dominate a conference it is 
often due as much to luck as to planning. 
But as far as the developing countries were 
concerned, UNCTAD V did have a central 
theme. It was one their ministers had 
selected in February when they had met in 
the Tanzanian capital of Arusha to plan 
their strategy for Manila. The central 
theme of UNCT ADV was to be an action 
programme for restructuring industry in 
the developed countries, in order to bring 
about the New International Economic 
Order the Third World has been pressing 
for since the 1973 oil crisis. 
A related issue was to be protectionism. 
The Group of 77 has watched with 
growing alarm the efforts of the major 
industriali zed countries, including the 
EEC, to limit import s of so-called 
'sensitive' products from the developing 
countries. In its view protectionism must 
be defeated for two reasons: (I) it is a 
barrier to the expansion of Third World 
exports of manufactured products and (2) 
it postpones the need for rich countries to 
restructure their declining industries. 
The industrialized countries were 
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generally sympathetic to both demands. 
The EEC spokesman, the French 
Economics Minister, M. Monory, told the 
conference that even in the case of a 
particularly sensitive sector - textiles -
the Community was following a policy 
whose twin objectives are (I) a control 
over imports so as to prevent a sudden, 
sharp rise as in 1977 and (2) changes in 
the structure of the industry so as to 
enable trade to develop more 
harmoniously in the future. 
But the EEC also made it clear that it 
did not share the priorities of the Group 
of 77. The fact is that for some time now 
the Common Market has been offering to 
help developing countries deal with the 
two problems it regards as the most 
crucial to their future development: food 
and energy. In the Community's view it is 
the growing shortage of food and energy 
in many developing countries which 
threatens the Third World more than 
anything else. 
Compromise on central 
issues could cause friction 
Even so, developed and developing 
countries were able to reach a compromise 
on both the central issues raised by the 
Group of 77. The resolution on 
protectionism calls on the rich countries 
to reduce and eventually eliminate 
quantative restrictions on their imports 
from the Third World. GATT, the 
Geneva-based body which conducted the 
recently concluded multi-lateral trade 
negotiations , is asked to examine any 
protectionist measures which 
industrialized countries may take against 
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the exports of developing countries. 
As for restructuring industry in the 
West, the resolution states that structural 
adjustment is a constant and global 
phenomenon. The resolution entrusts the 
Trade and Development Board, 
U NCT A D's main decision-making body, 
with the task of organizing an annual 
review of world production and trade . 
The purpose of such a review of course 
would be to help identify the elements or 
problems most relevant to the attainment 
of (I) optimum overall economic grow.th 
and (2) the development and diversification 
of the economies of developing countries. 
These annual reviews would result in 
recommendations of a general nature, 
which governments could take into 
consideration when drawing up their 
economic programmes. 
Both resolutions obviously represented 
a compromise . The fact remains, 
however, that the governments of the 
industrialized countries have given an 
undertaking to resist protectionist 
pressures and, what is perhaps even more 
important, to tackle the problem at its 
roots, by making the necessary structural 
adjustments so that industries seeking 
protection against imports can compete 
more effectively against them. 
For a number of reasons the 
implementation of the two resolutions is 
likely to be a continuing source of friction 
between developed and developing 
countries. The latter are bound to find the 
pace at which industrialized countries 
reorganize their industries much too slow. 
The fact is that in the short run industrial 
reorganization leads to loss of jobs and 
lower rates of economic growth. 
There will also be differences over the 
extent of the reorganization. Developing 
countries take the view that the 
industrialized should simply transfer 
certain manufacturing industries to the 
Third World, among them entire sections 
of the textile and clothing industries, the 
footwear industry, the assembly of 
consumer electronics, etc. But for the 
EEC's Commissioner for Industrial 
Policy, Etienne Davignon, the goal of 
industrial reorganization is to make 
industries more competitive, not to close 
them down - a process which is likely 
nevertheless to involve closures. 
Community trade with developing countries 
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The newly industrialized 
countries 
All industrialized countries accept the 
need to help the Third World 
industrialize. But with the rise of the 
newly industrialized countries such as 
South Korea, Singapore and Brazil, they 
are beginning to make a distinction 
among them. The European Community 
wants the NI Cs to undertake structural 
adjustments also, in the direction of 
diversification of their industrial 
activities. It also wants them to encourage 
domestic demand and open up their 
markets to imports. 
UNCT AD V provided strking 
confirmation of what has become very 
evident in the last 5 or 6 years. This is the 
increasingly heterogeneous nature of the 
Third World. The Countries now 
represented in the Group of 77 include 
semi-industrialized, high-growth 
economies as well as nomad, subsistence 
economies. Per capita incomes range 
from $50 in the least developed countries 
to over $5,000 in the rich, sparsely-
populated oil-exporting countries of the 
Middle East. 
The Group of 77 inevitably has found it 
more and more difficult to maintain its 
unity in the face of such extremes of 
economic development and income. As a 
result, it has become increasingly rigid in 
its attitudes and intolerant of any 
independent initiatives within its ranks. 
Not surprisingly, internal dissensions have 
increased. During the closing days of 
UNCT ADV the African group threatened 
to stage a walk-out on the grounds that its 
interests had been largely neglected, 
especially as regards the debt problem. 
But the most serious dispute within the 
Group of 77, and one which held !JP the 
Manila conference for three weeks, was 
over energy. Costa Rica, backed by a 
number of other Latin American 
countries, took the view that the group of 
high-level experts to be set up under the 
draft resolution on interdependence 
should have competence over questions of 
energy also. 
Although Cuba accused the 
industrialized countries of raising the issue 
12 
in order to divide the Third World, the 
Costa Rican initiative apparently was 
prompted by the fact that the OPEC 
countries have done more for Islamic 
nations facing economic hardship as a 
result of the rise in oil prices. However, 
pressure from the other developing 
countries (and a promise of increased 
financial aid) led Costa Rica to withdraw 
its proposal. 
The growing strains within the Group 
of 77 obviously have implications for the 
future of UNCT AD and the North-South 
dialogue. Both, it was being suggested in 
Manila, had outlived their usefulness. But 
there were no suggestions over what 
should take their place. It is clear, 
however, from the resolution on 
structural adjustments to industry, that 
developed and developing countries will 
have to work together if both are to enjoy 
economic growth. 
The example of Lome 
Regional arrangements such as the Lome 
Convention are one answer. But the 
EEC's Commissioner for Development 
Cooperation, Claude Cheysson, has 
described the Community's relations with 
its associated states as a model for the 
international community. This implies an 
international forum in which the eventual 
extension to all developing countries of 
successful regional arrangements can be 
envisaged. 
The most obvious forum in which to 
draw up a global development strategy is 
the United Nations, of course, acting 
through its Economic and Social 
Committee or even through special 
sessions of the General Assembly. This is 
precisely how the strategy for the Third 
Development Decade, covering the 1980s, 
is to be decided. 
Once the broad outlines of the strategy 
have been agreed on, its implementation 
can be entrusted to the various specialized 
agencies of the UN, the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank, GATT 
and regional organizations such as the 
Asian Development Bank. This would 
reduce UNCTAD's role but the result 
could well be a much more effective 
organisation. 
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£2,846m EEC finance to UK 
Between 1973 and the end of 1978, the 
various funds and lending agencies of the 
European Community allocated grants 
and loans to the United Kingdom of more 
than £2,846m. This finance is provided 
mainly to stimulate industrial investment 
and improve services like communications 
and water supply, so bringing new jobs to 
the less prosperous regions; to provide 
training for young people and those 
needing to change their job or find a new 
job; to modernise the coal and steel 
industries; and to encourage investment in 
agriculture and fisheries. 
The global figures are: 
Grants £747,126,000. 
Loans £2,099,392,000. 
Loan allocations, of course, have to be 
repaid, but the loans offered by the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) and by 
the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) are at highly competitive rates of 
interest and often on deferred repayment 
terms. The chart below gives details by 
fund and by region. 
Some grants and loans are made on a 
national basis and cannot be attributed to 
any particular region. This is particularly 
true of the Social Fund, which channels 
most of its finance through national 
organisations like industrial training 
boards or through government agencies 
like the Manpower Services Commission. 
The total for grant~ from the European 
Coal and Steel Community is not 
exhaustive. It does not, for instance, 
cover all research projects in these sectors. 
The Social Fund figure does not include 
all the experimental 'pilot projects'. 
Payments from the Agricultural 
Guarantee Fund for operations like 
support buying and butter subsidies are 
also not included in the totals. 
More detailed information on these 
grants and loans is available on request to 
the Editor, European Community, 
20 Kensington Palace Gardens, London 
W84 QQ, stating the region concerned. 
Grants and loans to the UK: 1973-78 (£) 
Hydro- Hill 
Social Regional Agricul. EIB Loans ECSC ECSC carbon farming 
Region fund fund Fund (£m) Loans Grants Granls Grants 
North England 3,884,462 63,547,409 .1,688, l 74 )68.05 223 .464.000 
Yorkshire & 
Humberside 153,590 11,427,759 6,773,605 63.26 207,480,000 
North West 16,585,066 37,946,342 3,256,095 118.4 3,520,000 
West Midlands 11 ,000 14.400 2,502,213 21,430,000 
East Midlands 137, 136 1,095,586 3,403,824 8.4 34,630,000 
East Ang lia 3,657,698 
Sout h West 120,919 3,992.046 3,108,035 10.0 
South East 49,575 1,758 ,519 7.0 3,760,000 
Scot land 18,943,190 69,783,896 14,323,758 30D9 55,900,000 
Wales 8, 163,780 41,029,381 2,275,296 141 .0 100,780,000 
Northern Ireland 37,879,979 39,911,084 11,865,629 21.0 
UK General 
Benefits 197,26 1,375 3,142,078 326.6 279,128,000 
National Totals 283,190,000 268,747,903 56,647 ,846 1169.30 930,092,000 70,000,000 17,000,000 51,540,000 
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Guide 
A Common Man's guide to the Common 
Market edited by Hugh Arbuthnott and 
Geoffrey Edwards (Macmillan for the 
Federal Trust, 213 pages, £8.95) 
An attempt to highlight the Community's 
basic principles and objectives which are 
easily lost sight of in the jungle of detail 
and the jargon used to describe it. It gives 
a short history of the Community, 
explains the institutions and decision 
making processes and the major policy 
areas . 
Politics 
The Christian Democratic Parties of 
Western Europe by R. E . M. Irving 
(George Allen & Unwin, 338 pages, £15) 
After discussing the pre-war origins of the 
Parties, the au(hor reviews their 
spectacular growth in the decade 
following 1945, their decline in the 1960s 
and revival in the 1970s. He analyses the 
political philosophy of Christian 
Democracy and discusses what the 
Christian Democratic and conservative 
political families have in common. 
Agriculture 
Agricultural implications of EEC 
Enlargement - Part I: Greece (Agra 
Europe London, £12.00). 
Enlargement of the EEC to include 
Greece, Spain and Portugal is likely to put 
further strain on the Common 
Agricultural Policy and cause a 
shift in the balance of power in the 
Community towards the Mediterranean 
countries and away from countries in the 
north. This report deals with the general 
economic and agricultural implications of 
enlargement, taking a detailed look at the 
agriculture of Greece. 
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How Europe Works 
In Europe - one man's view of how 
Europe really works by Basil de Ferranti 
(Eurosketch , 52 pages, £2.00) 
The former President of the EEC's 
Economic and Social Committee 
describes the workings of the Committee 
and chronicles his experiences over the 
two years of his presidency (1976-78). A 
final chapter speculates on the 
Committee's future development. 
Parliaments 
The European Parliament and National 
Parliaments edited by Valentine Herman 
and Rinus van Schendelen (Saxon House, 
304 pages, £9.50) 
This book is based on the papers presented 
by fifteen academics at a recent 
'workshop' in Grenoble. It considers 
national parliament-European Parliament 
relations from a variety of viewpoints. 
Britain 
Britain in Context by John D. Hey 
(Blackwell, 189 pages, £9.50 hardback, 
£3.95 paperback) 
An imaginative presentation of key 
economic and social facts and figures. 
The material is divided up into eighty-six 
topics, each presented on two (facing) 
pages, one devoted to a pictorial 
representation of the material, the other 
discussing it and giving the data sources. 
The topics are divided into three broad 
areas: Britain as part of the world, Britain 
as an economic aggregate and Britain as a 
society of individuals . 
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Community Europe 
The Countries of Community Europe - a 
geographical survey of contemporary 
issues 
by Geoffrey Parker (Macmillan, 
211 pages, £4.95) 
This survey of issues currently affecting 
the member countries of the Community 
is addressed mainly to students of regional 
and economic geography, European 
studies (political and economic) and 
business studies. It takes each country in 
turn, dealing with topics like energy 
provision, agricultural and industrial 
modernisation, regional development and 
problems of the environment. 
Statistic of the month 
Unemployed in the Nine (1978 averages) 
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Euro managers 
The New Euromanagers - an 
examination of the training and 
development requirements of future UK 
managers in Europe 
by Judy Lowe (Woodhead-Faulkner, 
Cambridge, 84 pages, £7 .25) 
This book looks at the changes that have 
taken place in management education and 
training in the UK since its entry into the 
EEC. It concentrates on moves to develop 
appropriate European-orientated 
programmes to enable UK managers to 
function more effectively in Europe. It 
will be specially helpful to those wanting 
to develop European training 
programmes and potential participants. 
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Politics ~ Summit 
Statement by Roy Jenkins after the Tokyo Summit 
meeting 
Speaking at a press conference after the 
World Economic Summit held in Tokyo 
on 28-29 June, Commission President 
Roy Jenkins underlined four main points. 
First, the Tokyo Summit did face up to 
the seriousness of the energy situation. It 
was not in every way an easy meeting. 
Energy, naturally in the circumstances, 
dominated it. There was much less of a 
general debate than in the previous world 
summit in Bonn, it was more of a 
negotiating meeting, and it got down to 
concrete questions and achieved concrete 
commitments. The meeting might not 
have done all it should ideally have done, 
but it did all that realistically could 
have been done. 
Second, and in particular, its major 
achievement was a firm United States 
commitment to a medium term goal. 
Given the American position as late as the 
eve of the summit, this was a significant 
advance. 
Third, following on from that, this 
United States commitment and the 
accompanying Canadian and Japanese 
undertakings were only possible because 
of the Community's strong position 
agreed at the European Council at 
Strasburg. This shows what the 
Community can achieve through 
solidarity and a common position. We 
should certainly not have achieved the 
United States undertaking without that. 
Fourth, the declaration of the Tokyo 
Summit in no way prejudices the positions 
of the five Community countries not 
individually represented (Benelux, 
Denmark and Ireland). They had all 
accepted the Strasbourg target, and they 
are in no way committed beyond that. The 
next step will be for them to undertake 
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similar national commitments within the 
Strasbourg target, and that these should 
be agreed and declared by the time of the 
Dublin European Council at the end of 
November. He did not anticipate any 
great difficulty about this. 
In conclusion, Roy Jenkins expressed 
satisfaction at the central role which the 
Community has played in the preparation 
and results at Tokyo, more so than at any 
previous summit. However, he hoped this 
would not lead us to be complacent. At 
the Energy Council two weeks ago , in 
Strasbourg and then last week in Tokyo, 
we worked out our first serious response 
to the new energy crisis. What counts now 
is to monitor and build on that, because 
unlike the five years after the shock of 
1973, our energy problems will not 
disappear even temporarily in the next five 
years. We are going to have to live with 
them and come to terms with them. We 
have just started, but fairly effectively, to 
do so . 
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